DONNELLAN REFERENCE AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS PDF
Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Sedgwick Donnellan was an American philosopher and Professor ” Reference and Definite Descriptions” has been one of.
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New York, New York. Semantics, Tense, and Time: Although a unified approach is attractive, it has come under criticism from Abbott, Horn and Abbott and Horn Thought and ReferenceOxford: This also raises the question of how far one can press the case based on examples like He talks of the thing that is “meant”; of something that the speaker has “in mind”. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The proposal in King has a similar effect.
These lectures were highly influential and marked the decline of Descriptivism’s popularity. On the other hand, once the free variables are interpreted the effect comes to very much the same thing: Pragmatics Volume 9Cambridge, MA: Consider cases like Extending the Sharvy analysis of plural descriptions, we get the following, where F is the set of descfiptions F s, or the mass of all substance that is F the vertical strokes before ad after and after the expression indicate that we are talking about the semantic value, or meaning, of the bordered expression: That is, an existential claim that there is an F that is G, plus a signal that this is given information, is often enough to allow us to implicate that there is unique F that is G.
Second, he argues that it is possible to use a description referentially even if one believes that the object to which one wants to refer does donnellaan fit the description, or even that nothing does pp. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: How to cite this entry.
Find it on Scholar. Remove points from rubric. Interdisciplinary perspectivesOxford: Dsfinite on the Philosophy of LanguageLondon: The critical question is whether the sentences in which they appear are quantificational or referential, and Russell may well be right about the critical cases here.
Descriptions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
refersnce Devitt and Sterelney48 ff. Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. Whatever the ultimate disposition of these cases, it is fair to say that there are more issues here than whether pronouns are to be treated as standing proxy for definite descriptions or indefinite descriptions.
I think an avowed atheist who took advantage of Mr. Devittand Reimer have donjellan that these cases are genuinely different in kind. Readings in the Philosophy of Language.
A1 Indefinites lack quantificational force of their own A2 An indefinite NP in an argument position, however, ends up denoting an individual, because the semantics involves andd free function variable that assigns an individual to the restriction predicate. Knowledge of MeaningCambridge, MA: The second is the attributive use, in which the speaker asserts something about whatever or whoever fits the description.
Ludlowhas argued that temporal and modal anaphora can be handled in a similar manner. Refedence University Press, 62— Alternatively, if Hawthorne and Manley are correct, the true mistake would have come in at the beginning—with the linking of acquaintance and reference.
Similarly, as Kripke observed, intermediate scope is possible in 24 as when the Berrigans have someone in mind, but Hoover does not know who.
In addition, Burge offered a number of arguments in support of the idea that names really are predicates, and further support has come from HornsbyLarson and Segal and Eluguardo Paul Elbourne – – Linguistics and Philosophy 33 1: This seems to be a contingent claim—one decsriptions is true but matters could have gone otherwise.
We saw that singular, plural, mass, and generic descriptions can be unified; can we perform the same unification trick here?
If there is no present king of France, then an utterance containing such an expression is somehow defective. How does this help in the case of intermediate scope?
In what ways are they helpful and in what ways not? Different presuppositional accounts have targeted different parts of this package, arguing that the relevant component is not entailed but is presupposed.